Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 12:11 am
Time: 12:11 am
Results for narcotics control
5 results foundAuthor: Mansfield, David Title: Poppy Free Provinces: A Measure or a Target? Summary: This report focuses on the concept of “poppy free” provinces — an increasingly important metric by which performance in counter-narcotics in Afghanistan is currently being judged. It is based on the fourth consecutive year of fieldwork conducted in the provinces of Nangarhar and Ghor under the auspices of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit’s Applied Thematic Research into Water Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy project, known in short as “WOL” and funded by the European Commission. The report does not offer a synthesis of the previous years of fieldwork undertaken, although clearly it draws on the body of knowledge established by this work. The report details the processes by which two provinces achieved what the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has come to refer to as “poppy free” status1 in the 2007/08 growing season. The two provinces are Nangarhar in the East of the country and Ghor in the central region. These are two markedly different provinces, not only from the perspective of the resources that the population have at their disposal, but also in the scale and depth of their engagement in the production and trade in opium. Matching the contrast in resources and engagement in opium poppy cultivation is the way in which Nangarhar and Ghor achieved their “poppy free” status in 2007/08 and the subsequent impact on the socioeconomic and political situation in these two provinces. The report contrasts the way in which these two provinces became opium poppy free in the 2007/08 growing season. It highlights the proactive role played by the Governor of Nangarhar in banning opium poppy: his use of coercion, persuasion and tribal structures to create an environment in which the population was not confident that there was sufficient unity within the tribes to prevent the opium crop being destroyed were they to plant it. The report also outlines how early eradication in key districts served to increase this perception of risk and, when combined with a successful attempt by the local authorities to create the impression that the heightened profile of the Unites States military in the province was primarily aimed at counter-narcotics rather than counterinsurgency, succeeded in deterring planting across Nangarhar. The report highlights how the situation in Ghor could not be more different. Here, the negligible levels of cultivation were the consequence of environmental and market forces. It shows how low opium yields and falling farm-gate prices have acted against opium poppy and, in the wake of dramatic increases in wheat prices in the 2007/08 growing season, have made it irrational to cultivate opium poppy. The reports shows that those who persist with cultivation typically do so because they have no other sources of cash income. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2009. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 19, 2011 at: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/AREU_PoppyFreeProvinces_MeasureOrTarget.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/AREU_PoppyFreeProvinces_MeasureOrTarget.pdf Shelf Number: 121398 Keywords: Drug PolicyNarcotics ControlOpium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: Pain, Adam Title: Opium Poppy Strikes Back: The 2011 Return of Opium in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces Summary: Opium poppy cultivation has re-emerged in Balkh and Badakhshan in 2011. In Badakhshan, it has spread across several districts in rainfed areas and, according to informal estimates, the cultivated area has doubled from official figures of 1,100 hectares (ha) in 2010 to around 2,200 ha. In Balkh—which was declared “poppy-free” in 2006—opium’s return has been more location-specific; it is currently being planted openly on a small scale in Chimtal District. While a rise in opium prices has played an important part, a range of contextual factors including power, insecurity, social identity, agro-ecology and location are also important in explaining the crop’s re-emergence, as well as the patterns of difference within and between the two provinces. Driven by a fall in production in the South in 2010, the rising price of opium is a contributing factor to the expansion of cultivation. However, this has also taken place in the context of a failing rural economy; many households are food insecure, rural employment is scarce and there is rising insecurity. In the eyes of many rural informants, promises made in 2006 to support the rural economy as a return for giving up opium poppy cultivation have not been met. There is also a sense, especially in Badakhshan, that southern provinces are being rewarded with greater levels of development funding despite their failure to give up the crop. Counter-narcotics policies and support to rural development do not appear to have generated the conditions that might encourage households to move permanently away from opium poppy cultivation. The real indicator of effective counter-narcotics strategies is to make farmers relatively insensitive to opium prices; this is clearly not yet the case. There are no easy solutions to the persistence of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. However, evidence from this study suggests a number of ways to improve both counternarcotics strategy and support for the development of the rural economy: • The notion of “poppy free” should be abandoned as an indicator of success. Supply reductions in one place can have price effects that shift production elsewhere. This reflects the irrepressible demand that continues to drive the opium market. • The re-emergence of cultivation in areas where it had declined highlights the limits of previous interventions. It also suggests the lack of a geographically joined-up counter-narcotics strategy. Provinces and districts are not islands and the return of opium cultivation to old areas is a reflection of this. • There is a need to recognise the significant political obstacles that exist to growth. The commodity market in urban centres such as Mazar-i-Sharif is characterised by non-competitive, exclusionary behaviour. A supply-side approach to agricultural development thus makes it difficult to give Afghanistan’s agricultural economy a competitive edge compared to its more powerful regional neighbours. This is especially important as there is also limited room to protect the domestic market from aggressive competition from outside. • The rural economy lacks domestic demand. A broader, less neo-liberal approach could involve using cash transfers and social protection measures to help reduce livelihood risks and increase local purchasing power. Combined with measures to increase agricultural productivity, this could help create the incentives to increase productivity and help reduce the risks of markets for the poor. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2011. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1116E%20Opium%20Poppy%20Strikes%20Back%20CS%202011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1116E%20Opium%20Poppy%20Strikes%20Back%20CS%202011.pdf Shelf Number: 123233 Keywords: Narcotics ControlOpium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Drug Control Initial Review of the National Strategy and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment Programs Summary: An estimated 22.6 million Americans aged 12 or older were illicit drug users in 2010, representing 8.9 percent of the population aged 12 or older, according to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health. This represents the highest overall rate of illicit drug users among this population group since 2002, when the rate was 8.3 percent. Abuse of illicit drugs results in significant social, public health, and economic consequences for the United States. For example, the economic impact of illicit drug use, including the costs of crime, health care, and lost productivity, was estimated at more than $193 billion in 2007, the most recent year for which data were available. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was established by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to, among other things, enhance national drug control planning and coordination and represent the drug policies of the executive branch before Congress. In this role, ONDCP provides advice and governmentwide oversight of drug programs and is responsible for coordinating drug control activities, including federal drug abuse prevention and treatment programs, and related funding across the federal government. ONDCP is required annually to develop the National Drug Control Strategy (Strategy), which sets forth a plan to reduce illicit drug use through prevention, treatment, and law enforcement programs, and to develop a Drug Control Budget for implementing the Strategy. ONDCP reported that for fiscal year 2012, about $25.2 billion was provided for drug control programs across 17 federal departments and independent agencies. Further, according to ONDCP, from 2004 to 2012 this signified an increase of $5.9 billion (about 31 percent) for drug control programs, including drug abuse prevention and treatment programs. The 2010 Strategy is the inaugural strategy guiding drug policy under President Obama’s administration and, according to ONDCP officials, sought a comprehensive approach to drug policy, including an emphasis on drug abuse prevention and treatment efforts and the use of evidence-based practices—approaches to prevention or treatment that are based in theory and have undergone scientific evaluation. Drug abuse prevention includes activities focused on discouraging the first-time use of controlled substances and efforts to encourage those who have begun to use illicit drugs to cease their use. Treatment includes activities focused on assisting regular users of controlled substances to become drug free through such means as counseling services, inpatient and outpatient care, and the demonstration and provision of effective treatment methods. National Drug Control Program agencies (drug control agencies) follow a detailed process in developing their annual budget submissions for inclusion in the Drug Control Budget, which provides information on the funding that the executive branch requested for drug control to implement the Strategy. Agencies submit to ONDCP the portion of their annual budget requests dedicated to drug control, which they prepare as part of their overall budget submission to the Office of Management and Budget for inclusion in the President’s annual budget request. ONDCP reviews the budget requests of the drug control agencies to determine if the agencies have acceptable methodologies for estimating their drug control budgets, and includes those that do in the Drug Control Budget . Agencies may administer programs that include drug abuse prevention and treatment activities but do not meet ONDCP’s standards for having an acceptable budget estimation methodology. Such programs are not represented in the Drug Control Budget. Part of the 2010 Strategy is a long-term policy goal for increasing the emphasis on preventing and treating substance abuse. Multiple federal departments—and their component agencies, bureaus, divisions, and offices—and independent agencies (collectively referred to as agencies), administer drug abuse prevention and treatment programs, fund these programs, or both. The drug abuse prevention and treatment programs vary and may include grants to service providers, direct services, and education and outreach activities. For example, an agency’s grant program may award block grants to grantees, such as states or local entities, to implement their own interventions through community-based drug abuse prevention or treatment programs, while direct service programs often entail interventions directly administered by an agency to a specific population. Drug abuse prevention and treatment programs target various populations and use a wide variety of interventions, which are strategies or approaches intended to prevent an undesirable outcome, such as abuse of an illicit drug; promote a desirable outcome, such as reducing the use of alcohol among youth; or alter the course of an existing condition, such as successful treatment of drug addiction. Some programs may be either jointly funded or administered by two or more agencies. In light of the increase in the rate of illicit drug use among Americans, efforts to oversee and coordinate the implementation of the Strategy and ensure that ONDCP and federal agencies invest in the most effective drug abuse prevention and treatment programs become more important. You asked us to determine the extent to which the 2010 Strategy has been implemented, review the sources of funding for federal drug abuse prevention and treatment programs as well as federal agency efforts to coordinate their programs, and examine agencies’ efforts to evaluate drug abuse prevention and treatment programs and ensure that they are effective. Specifically, in this report we (1) provide an initial review of the extent to which the 2010 Strategy has been implemented, the extent to which ONDCP coordinates its implementation across drug control agencies, and how ONDCP assesses the effectiveness of the Strategy in preventing and reducing drug use; (2) review what agencies fund drug abuse prevention and treatment programs and how agencies coordinate their programs; and (3) provide an initial review of the extent to which federal agencies evaluate their drug abuse prevention and treatment programs and the extent to which agencies assess their programs’ effectiveness. This is the first report in response to your request that we assess the implementation of the 2010 Strategy. This report describes the implementation approach, federal agencies’ drug abuse prevention and treatment programs, and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of Education (Education) efforts to assess the effectiveness of their drug abuse prevention and treatment programs. We will continue our work on these issues and plan to evaluate the extent to which the 2010 Strategy has been implemented and coordinated across agencies and how ONDCP assesses the effectiveness of the Strategy in preventing and reducing drug use. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-744R: Accessed August 8, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-744R Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-744R Shelf Number: 125909 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug Abuse Policy (U.S.)Drug Control PolicyNarcotics Control |
Author: Micolta, Patricia Title: Illicit Interest Groups: The Political Impact of The Medellin Drug Trafficking Organizations in Colombia Summary: Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political organizations. Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters. Illicit groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar ways. Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and policy impact. The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research. To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO leaders, popularly known as the "Medellin Cartel." In particular, the study focused on the external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the United States. The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating the illicit drug business. The study's findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government's push for tougher counternarcotics efforts. Details: Miami, FL: Florida International University, 2012. 290p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed October 25, 2012 at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1732&context=etd Year: 2012 Country: Colombia URL: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1732&context=etd Shelf Number: 126806 Keywords: Drug ControlDrug Trafficking (Colombia)Medellin CartelNarcotics ControlOrganized Crime |
Author: Pain, Adam Title: "Let Them Eat Promises": Closing the Opium Poppy Fields in Balkh and its Consequences Summary: In 2007, many pointed to the example of Balkh Province, where the reported area of opium poppy fell from 7200 hectares (ha) in 2005-06 to zero in 2006-07. Drawing on these area statistics, international agencies have claimed that incentives, and improvements in security and governance, preceded and led to the end of opium cultivation. Afghan officials offer a different interpretation of events and emphasise the failure to respond to the decline that has been achieved, effectively admitting that the closure was due to coercion. The field evidence presented in this report does not support claims that farmers' decisions to stop cultivating opium poppy stemmed from the provision of incentives or development - nor does it find evidence of improved governance or security. If anything, conditions are worse. Moreover, the report discovered that the sudden closure of opium poppy cultivation in 2006 in Balkh has prompted a decline in livelihood security for many rural households, the effects of which have been compounded by the harsh winter and subsequent failure of the rains in early 2008. Prices for livestock have fallen by half since last year, fodder prices have risen, labour wage rates have dropped by two-thirds since 2006, and grain prices have doubled or more. Emigration from downstream villages has been significant; in some cases, 90 percent of the male labour force has left, reportedly mostly to Iran. Not only is labour leaving, but households are also closing up their houses and departing for Pakistan and elsewhere. In short, there is now acute livelihood insecurity in Balkh. The claims for success have been built solely around the indicator of opium poppy area. There are two parties to this debate both using the same indicator but drawing different conclusions from it and for different reasons. For one party, the opium area indicator has been taken as evidence of underlying causal changes (incentives and development) for which opium area reduction is an outcome or goal achievement. The other party uses opium area as a result - something that has been delivered through direct action - and is looking for rewards for having achieved it. There are flaws in both positions that are mutually reinforcing in terms of their negative consequences. The positions are also contradictory but this difficulty appears to have been glossed over given the mutual desire to claim success. Above all, the methods used to end opium poppy cultivation in Balkh are contrary to the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), but this has been ignored. What could better counter-narcotic policy practice in Balkh have been? First, the coerced closure of opium poppy cultivation should not have been accepted; the guidelines of the NDCS should have been followed, requiring careful monitoring of processes of change and rejecting opium area as an appropriate indicator at this stage. Second, a better understanding should have been developed regarding the underlying drivers of opium poppy cultivation in the district. This would have prompted the realisation that off-farm prospects of employment for the effectively landless poor who make up the majority of households - would be extremely limited once the opium economy dried up, and that measures would need to be taken and interventions designed to address this. Will the current demise of opium poppy cultivation hold in Balkh? Certainly downstream villages are not in a strong position to challenge it, being politically weak and water deprived. Will upstream villages rebel? Much depends on the extent to which patronage continues to flow from the authorities, but the evidence suggests upstream villages are far from happy with the consequences of the closure of the opium poppy economy, even though for those with land in such villages there is little evidence that livelihood security is at stake. Balkh though is not Nangarhar, which has more homogenous social identities that can unite to protest. Nevertheless, the impact of counter-narcotic policy's so-called "success" in Balkh could yet push disparate groups into a unified protest. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2008. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Case Studies Series: Accessed June 12, 2018 at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1350685/1227_1234789124_afghanistan.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1350685/1227_1234789124_afghanistan.pdf Shelf Number: 150520 Keywords: Narcotics ControlOpium Poppy Cultivation |